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Abstract 
 
The free trade agreement between China and the Gulf Cooperation Council (“the 
GCC”) currently under negotiation is due to become China’s first comprehensive trade and 
investment agreement with a supranational customs union. The article explores the challenges 
and opportunities of the proposed China-GCC Free Trade Agreement. It proposes tailor-made 
recommendations according to the specific interests of both parties.  
  
Introduction 
 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (“the GCC”) comprises Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, 
Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (“the UAE”). China and the GCC countries are 
WTO Members and thus are parties to WTO agreements such as the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
Moreover, China has embraced the significance of bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) to 
continuous growth.2 China’s past FTAs are mainly signed with small economies, showing 
‘big country morality’3 by entering into FTAs to help smaller nations but not to reap the 
benefits of large trade volumes. On the other hand, the GCC has signed FTAs with Singapore 
in 2008 and with the European Free Trade Association (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, 
Switzerland) (EFTA) in 2009.  
This article makes recommendations for a proposed free trade agreement (“the 
proposed FTA”) between China and the GCC (“the Parties”) under negotiation, a process                                                         
1 Gonzalo Villalta Puig is Head of the School of Law and Politics, Professor of Law and Chair of the 
Constitutional Law of Economic Integration at The University of Hull. He is an Overseas Fellow of the 
Australian Academy of Law and a Fellow of the European Law Institute. Prof Villalta Puig is chair of the 
Research Group for Constitutional Studies of Free Trade and Political Economy of the International Association 
of Constitutional Law and a member of the Study Group on Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements of 
the International Law Association. He is a member of the Full Council of the International Law Association. 
Prof Villalta Puig is Associate Editor of the Global Journal of Comparative Law (Brill Nijhoff). 
2 John Whalley et al., China’s Regional and Bilateral Trade Agreements, (Institute of World Economics and 
Politics, Working Paper No. 201408, 2014), 
http://eniwep.cssn.cn/webpic/web/eniwep/upload/2014/04/d20140410153552466.pdf. 
3 Zha Daojiong, China’s Economic Diplomacy Focusing on the Asia-Pacific Region, 1(1) CHINA QUARTERLY OF 
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES 85, 85-104 (2015). 
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formally launched in 2004.4 It aims to address critical issues during Sino-GCC negotiations, 
thereby analyzing the prospects and challenges of the proposed FTA, especially in services 
and investment. It can serve as prelude to a wider GCC-ASEAN FTA.5 It has three parts. Part 
One analyzes the political economy and security considerations that help to understand the 
needs of the Parties. Part Two examines the trade interdependence between the Parties and 
the negotiation progress. Part Three analyzes the key issues of the proposed FTA and makes 
recommendations. The article concludes that capacity building should be the predominant 
objective of the proposed FTA.  
 
Part One: Political Economy and Security Considerations 
 
China’s political system is dominated by the Communist Party of China (“CPC”) 
without judicial checks. For the CPC, law is only a means of governance. Thus, rule of law is 
weak in China. It values collective prosperity rather than human rights.6 
On the other hand, the GCC was formed in 1981 for external security purposes. Its 
members are energy-rich monarchies that share mutual political and security interests. The 
society is highly hierarchical.7 Human rights have been disregarded by the various GCC 
governments.8  
The rapid growth in oil production enables the rulers of the GCC countries to 
entrench their authority. Citizens rely on oil revenue to achieve a higher rank in social 
hierarchy.9 Thus the GCC governments depend on oil production to prevent dissent apart 
from external security.  
Concerning foreign policy, China has adopted a non-interventionist policy and did not 
compete with the United States (“US”) to protect the Gulf’s stability before the 9/11 terrorist 
attack. Besides, the 1991 Gulf War made China’s approach to insulate itself from the Gulf 
                                                        
4 JORGE MONGAY, BUSINESS AND INVESTMENTS IN ASIA: NEW CHALLENGES, NEW OPPORTUNITIES, 193 (ESIC 
Editorial, 1st ed. 2012). 
5 Nasser H Saidi, The Gulf Should Pivot East and Build the ‘New Silk Road’, THE HUFFINGTON POST Apr. 15, 
2014 (last updated June 15, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-nasser-h-saidi/the-gulf-should-pivot-
eas_b_5010038.html. 
6 Olivia Enos, Why China’s Human Rights Violation Do Matter, Daily Signal, Sep. 23, 2015, 
http://dailysignal.com/2015/09/23/why-chinas-human-rights-violations-do-matter/. 
7 TAREQ Y. ISMAEL, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS TODAY: GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY 339 (2001).  
8 Jennifer Fenton, ‘Significant Ramping’ of Political Repression in the Gulf, Activists Warn, ALJAZEERA AM., Apr. 15, 2015,  http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/4/15/bahrain-human-rights-gcc-monarchies.html. 
9 Ismael, supra note 7 at 341. 
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impossible.10 The crisis in Libya and Sudan in 2011 and the Iran nuclear deal in 2015 
prompted China towards a more balanced approach towards the GCC countries.11 Since 
2008, China has been discovering key national interests in the GCC.12 It seeks to safeguard 
its assets and citizens in the Gulf. China has changed its diplomatic strategy towards the GCC 
from non-intervention to active pragmatism.13  
Meanwhile, the GCC has placed vital importance on security. Notably, political 
challenges caused by the Iran-Iraq War highlight the significance of political commitment for 
enhancing integration of the GCC.14 Political events like the Arab Spring and the 9/11 attack 
have stimulated the GCC countries to handle their affairs free from US and European Union 
interference.15 Regarding China as a constructive force to enhance its stability,16 the GCC has 
pursued the ‘looking east policy’ to seek opportunities for strategic partnership with China.17  
Notably, the Parties share a strong interest in safeguarding domestic stability.18 As 
China highly depends on oil imports from the GCC, it seeks to ensure the stability of energy 
relations.19 Meanwhile, the GCC hopes to safeguard its energy reserves. Thus, it shields 
Chinese interests in the Middle East from threats20 to the security of shipping links. 
Moreover, the Parties have to work together to safeguard the sea lanes emerging from China’s 
One Belt One Road (“OBOR”) initiative. 
Sino-GCC disagreement over global responses to the Syrian conflict hampered their 
negotiations in 2009.21 Nonetheless, both sides agreed to facilitate political settlement on the 
Syrian disagreement in 2014 and even expressed the urgency of peaceful political settlement                                                         
10 John Calabrese, China and the Persian Gulf: Energy and Security, 52 MIDDLE EAST J. 351, 366 (1998). 
11 Lars Erslev Andersen & Yang Jiang, Oil, Security, and Politics: Is China Challenging the US in the Persian 
Gulf?, 29 DANISH INST. FOR INT’L STUD. 1, 6 (2014),  http://www.diis.dk/files/media/documents/publications/diis_report_29_web.pdf.  
12 Wu Bingbing et al., China and the Persian Gulf: Implications for the United States, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS 1, 10 (2011), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ASIA%20Program_China%20and%20the%20PG.pdf. 
13 Andersen & Jiang, supra note 11 at 6. 
14 Gonzalo Villalta Puig & Amer Al-Khodiry, The Economic and Monetary Union of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, 46 J. OF WORLD TRADE 121, 140-41 (2012).  
15 Andersen & Jiang, supra note 11 at 5. 
16 Chen Mo, Exploring economic relations between China and the GCC States, 5(4) J. OF MIDDLE EASTERN & ISLAMIC STUDIES. 88, 102 (2011). 
17 Andersen & Jiang , supra note 11,at 41. 
18 Jon B. Alterman, China’s Balancing Act in the Gulf, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, 3 (2013), https://csis.org/files/publication/130821_Alterman_ChinaGulf_Web.pdf. 
19 Mike Burnham, Georgetown Security Studies Review: China in the Middle East, GEO. U. CTR. FOR SECURITY STUD. (2015), http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/GSSR-Asia-Conference.pdf. 
20 Id. 
21 Adel Al Toraifi, Chinese Foreign Minister: Our position on Syria is objective and fair, ASHARQ AL AWSAT (2014), http://english.aawsat.com/2014/03/article55330119/chinese-foreign-minister-our-position-on-syria-is-objective-and-fair. 
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of Syria in 2016.22 Both sides oppose terrorism. This common approach favors their security 
cooperation in the context of a wider strategic partnership. 
As for economic policy, China pursues ‘going-out’ strategies and regards service as 
the priority.23 China promotes ‘supply-side structural reform’,24 which includes technological 
innovation and infrastructure. Notably, Xi launched the OBOR initiative in 2015.25 It aims to 
link China to Europe and the Middle East.26 
The GCC members have committed to integrate their economies since the 
establishment of the GCC. The GCC became a Custom Union in 2003.27 Its common market 
status was declared in 2008 and has long aspired for the establishment of single GCC 
currency.28 Yet, its economic integration remains difficult because of its structural 
weaknesses, persistent obstacles to cross-border mobility within the GCC and different 
regulatory frameworks.29 
While the GCC heavily relies on oil revenue, oil is exhaustible.30 To cope with 
uncertainties in the international oil market, the GCC countries promote privatization and 
utilize oil revenue for economic diversification. They are also investing more in 
manufacturing and services.31 As the technological and managerial intelligence of Chinese 
financial firms have become increasingly competitive, their penetration into GCC markets 
would stimulate the diversification of the GCC economies’ from energy production to 
services.32 Yet, most private sector jobs are still filled by foreign workers. 33 Thus, 
diversification in the GCC still faces obstacles such as the failure to generate significant job                                                         
22 Saudi Arabia, China issue joint communiqué on establishing comprehensive strategic partnership between 
the two countries, ALYAMAMH, (Mar. 19, 2016), http://www.alriyadh.com/en/article/1121322/Saudi-Arabia-China-issue-joint-communiqu-on-establishing-comprehensive-strategic-partnership-between-the-two-countries.  
23 China – Minutes of the Meeting, ¶ 1.7., WTO Doc. WT/TPR/M/300 (Aug. 26, 2014) [Hereinafter China Meeting Minutes]. 
24 China’s ‘supply-side structural reform’ to boost new economy’, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 31, 2015, http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-12/31/content_22885281.htm. 
25 Wu Sike, Constructing “One Belt and One Road” and Enhancing the China-GCC Cooperation, 9(2) J. OF MIDDLE EASTERN & ISLAMIC STUD., 1, 1-15 (2015). 
26 Id. 
27 Theodore Karasik, The GCC’s New Affair with China, MIDDLE EAST INST. (2016), http://www.mei.edu/content/map/gcc%E2%80%99s-new-affair-china. 
28 Ali Al-Abdulrazzaq & Kevin Carey, Economic Integration in the GCC, THE WORLD BANK (2010), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/GCCStudyweb.pdf. 
29 Id.  
30 Tim Callen & Reda Cherif, Economic Diversification in the GCC: Past, Present, and Future, IMF STAFF DISCUSSION NOTE (2014), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2014/sdn1412.pdf. 
31 Michael Thorpe & Sumit Mitra, Growing Economic Interdependence of China and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, SOC. SCI. RESEARCH NETWORK (2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1126942.. 
32 Mo supra at 15. 
33 Callen & Cherif, supra note 29. 
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opportunities for nationals. 
 
Part Two: Origins and Development 
To bolster economic growth, China is interested in deepening trade and investment 
ties with the GCC.34 It perceives the GCC as a paramount partner, especially in energy.35 
China is predicted to become the largest exporter to the GCC by 2020.36 
As regards the OBOR initiative, Saudi Arabia has expressed its willingness to 
participate in establishing interconnectivity in the GCC as it stands at a crucial junction along 
OBOR routes.37 The GCC views the OBOR as a natural partner that promotes mutual 
benefits by its deeper investment in China including renewable energy, infrastructure, 
aviation, finance and telecommunications.38 These opportunities would be enticements for 
both sides to support OBOR and favor the conclusion of the proposed FTA. 
The Parties began negotiations in 2004. Both sides started to negotiate service trades 
after agreeing in principle to trade in goods in 2009 but the talks halted in the same year. The 
Saudi Crown Prince visited Beijing in March 2014.39 Sino-GCC negotiations for the FTA 
resumed in December 2015.40 Subsequently Xi met with Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Crown 
Prince Mohammed bin Salmon on January 19 2016. They have agreed to expedite progress to 
conclude a comprehensive FTA by the end of 2016.41 Meanwhile, the two sides agreed to 
elevate their ties to a strategic partnership.42 The sixth round of China-GCC official 
negotiation was held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia from February 29 to March 3 2016.43 
Subsequently, the Parties held the seventh round of negotiations in Guangzhou from 8 to 10 
May 2016.44 They have achieved positive progress in issues such as trade in services,                                                         
34 Matteo Legrezi & Fred H.Lawson, China’s Gulf Policy: Existing Theories, New Perspectives,  22(2) MIDDLE 
EAST POLICY 58, 58-71 (2015). 
35 Wu, supra note 25. 
36 Robert Bailey, China And GCC: Growing Ties, GULF BUSINESS, Apr. 16, 2013, 
http://www.gulfbusiness.com/articles/insights/china-and-gcc-growing-ties/. 
37 GCC and China Decide to Speed up Free Trade Talks, SAUDI GAZETTE, Jan. 21, 2016, 
http://saudigazette.com.sa/saudi-arabia/gcc-and-china-decide-to-speed-up-free-trade-talks/. 
38 Id. 
39 ZHA DAOJIONG & MICHAEL MEIDAN, CHINA AND THE MIDDLE EAST IN A NEW ENERGY LANDSCAPE, 9 (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 2015), 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/20151021ChinaMiddleEastEnerg
yDaojiongMeidan.pdf. 
40 China, GCC Vow to Reach Comprehensive FTA within 2016, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, PRC (Jan, 28, 2016), 
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/engcc/engccnews/201601/30498_1.html. 
41 Bailey, supra note 36. 
42 ‘China, Saudi Arabia Elevate Bilateral Ties, Eye More Industrial Capacity Cooperation, XINHUA, Jan. 20, 
2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/20/c_135025406.htm. 
43 The 6th Round of China - GCC FTA Negotiations Held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, 
PRC (Mar. 10, 2016), http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/engcc/engccnews/201603/30938_1.html. 
44 Id. 
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investment and technological cooperation.45 
Unlike China’s past FTAs, the major driving force of the agreement is the significant 
energy trade between the Parties. Considering the Parties’ FTAs, the China-Australia FTA 
(“ChAFTA”) is China’s first comprehensive FTA signed with a strong developed country in 
the west, making most achievements in service and investment liberalization.46 The GCC-
Singapore FTA (“GSFTA”) is the first FTA signed by the GCC with an Asian country.47 It has 
been asserted that the proposed FTA should build upon the GSFTA.48  
China considered its past FTAs as learning lessons for potential FTAs with sequential 
trading partners.49 Yet, the Chinese approach to FTAs is not to adopt a template for all but 
customize a negotiating strategy according to the interests of the trading partners.50 For 
instance, the China-ASEAN agreement emphasizes broad commitments of developmental 
cooperation besides precise commitments. In contrast, the China-New Zealand FTA 
(“NZCFTA”) favors more precise commitments than developmental cooperation.  
In addition, it would be rewarding to draw insights from innovative provisions from 
successful FTAs worldwide,51 notably the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (“CETA”). CETA has been praised for prescribing a ‘new gold standard’ for 
international FTAs.52 Hence, selected WTO-plus innovations in the ChAFTA, GSFTA and 
CETA will be adopted as a reference in this article. 
 
Part Three: Challenges and Opportunities 
 
Experience from the Failure of EU – GCC FTA Negotiations 
 
FTA negotiations between the EU and the GCC stalled for a number of reasons. The 
first hindrance to EU-GCC FTA negotiations was disagreement over human rights and                                                         
45 The 7th Round of China - GCC FTA Negotiation Concluded, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, PRC (May 12, 2016), 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significantnews/201605/20160501316237.shtml. 
46 Interpretation for China - Australia Free Trade Agreement, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, PRC (Jun.19, 2015), 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Cocoon/201510/20151001144954.shtml, [hereinafter 
Interpretation for China-Australia Free Trade Agreement]. 
47 Kevin Körner, The GCC Going East, DEUTSCHE BANK, Feb. 18, 2014, at 4, 
https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-
PROD/PROD0000000000329687/The+GCC+going+East%253A+Economic+ties+with+developing+Asia+on+t
he+rise.pdf. 
48 Saidi, supra note 5. 
49 Whalley, supra note 2 at 9. 
50 Id. at 10-11. 
51 Christina L. Davis, The Political Logic of Dispute Settlement: Introduction to the Special Issue, 15(2) THE 
REV. OF INT’L ORG.  12 (2015), replicated at https://www.princeton.edu/~cldavis/files/ROIO_DavisIntro.pdf. 
52 Constantine Passaris, CETA - Greece’s Saviour?, OPENCANADA.ORG, Dec. 2, 2014, 
https://www.opencanada.org/features/ceta-greeces-saviour/. 
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democratic processes.53 The European Parliament insisted on imposing a human rights clause 
which the GCC countries54 perceived as political condition to any final agreement.55 
Secondly, the GCC countries hoped to gain technical assistance for their deepening regional 
integration.56 Yet the EU has made limited contributions to the integration of the GCC into 
global markets.57 Institutional differences and conflicting cultural values further hindered the 
progress of EU-GCC negotiations.58 Thirdly, the GCC was unhappy with the EU’s high 
tariffs on petrochemical exports.59 The EU claimed that the high level of tariffs is justified by 
the subsidies received by Gulf producers. Building the relationship upon the reasons for these 
various disagreements is the key to any eventual resumption of FTA talks.60  
Unlike EU-GCC FTA negotiations, the Parties would not face the same deadlock as to 
human rights clause because they do not show much concern for these considerations. 
Besides, Sino-GCC negotiations are unlikely to be hindered by conflicting values. Both 
Parties have appreciated the significance of people-to-people exchanges to deepen 
cooperation.61 The OBOR initiative would add substance to people-to-people cooperation by 
facilitating cultural exchanges. Besides, Chinese Confucianism respects diversity. While 
conflicting cultural values are unlikely to be a setback as in EU-GCC negotiations, China 
needs to recognize Islamic cultural exceptions. 
Nonetheless, the major challenge to the proposed FTA concerns the Chinese 
determination to restrict access of GCC petrochemical exporters to its markets. The GCC 
suspects China’s desire is to shield domestic producers from international competition.62 
Thus, current negotiations with China seem to resemble talks with the EU regarding 
petrochemical issues. This difficulty may imply the need for China to make concessions so as 
not to protect domestic producers persistently.  
                                                         
53 Passaris, supra note 52. 
54 M. Anaam Hashmi, Is There A Need for A Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and Gulf 
Cooperation Council?, 13(1) INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & ECONOMICS RESEARCH JOURNAL 113, 113-120 
(2014). 
55 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The Gulf States in International Political Economy 
 (International Political Economy Series, 1st ed. 2015).    
56 Rym Ayadi, Relations between EU & Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT at 
17 & 21 (Oct. 25, 2010), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2010/433742/EXPO-
AFET_NT(2010)433742_EN.pdf. 
57 Hashmi, supra note 54. 
58 Valentina Kostadinova, What is the Status of the EU - GCC Relationship?, GULF RESEARCH CENTER, at 3-4, 
10  (2013),  https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/167338/EU-GCC_9227.pdf__.pdf. 
59 Ayadi, supra note 56. 
60 Kostadinova, supra note 58, at 3. 
61 China, GCC Agree to Accelerate FTA Negotiations, NEWS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA, Jan. 16, 
2016, http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66102/7706041.html. 
62 Ulrichsen, supra note 55. 
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Trade in Goods 
      
The Parties ‘substantially concluded in principle the negotiations on trade in goods’ in 
January 2016. Both sides had actually agreed on the market access of 97% of goods in 2009. 
According to World Tariff Profile 2015, China’s simple average Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) tariff rate was 9.6% in 2014. The average tariff for agricultural products is 15.2% 
while the average tariff for non-agricultural products is 8.6% in 2014. On the other hand, the 
simple average MFN tariff rates in 2014 for the main GCC member, Saudi Arabia is 5.1%. Its 
average tariff for agricultural and non-agricultural products are 5.9% and 5% respectively. In 
the same year, the other two main GCC members, namely, Qatar and the UAE have simple 
average MFN tariff rates of 4.7%. Qatar has an average tariff of 5.3% for agricultural 
products while that of UAE is and 5.4%. The average for non-agricultural products is 
commonly 4.6%. Thus, China has higher simple average tariff rates than those of GCC 
countries. In particular, China’s higher tariff rate for agricultural products shows higher 
protection of its domestic production of agricultural products.  
To be WTO-compatible, GATT Article XXIV:8 provides for the elimination of ‘duties 
and other restrictive regulations’ with respect to ‘substantially all the trade’ between the 
parties. Quantitatively, the standard requires 90% of tariffs to be removed.63 Considering the 
tariff elimination schedules of past FTAs, over 85% of Australia’s exports will enter China 
duty free when ChAFTA came into force and an additional 8% upon full implementation. 
GSFTA eliminates tariffs on 93.3% of goods of Singaporean origin when it came into force 
while an additional 2.7% will phase out after a 5-year transitional period. Hence, the Parties’ 
past FTAs generally meet the benchmark of 90% and support the approach of eliminating 
most of the tariffs immediately at date of entry into force, leaving a small percentage to 
gradually phase out after a specified transitional period.  
Generally, the Parties impose low tariff rate for non-agricultural products. While the 
GCC countries rely on Chinese imports for industrial products,64 China imports metals from 
the GCC.65 Notably, the UAE has been one of China’s significant exporters of aluminum, 
thus it has called for the elimination of tariffs on aluminum.66 Meanwhile, China’s chemical                                                         
63 Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION on the conclusion of an Association Agreement between the European 
Community and its Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part, EUR-LEX 
Document 52002PC0536(02)  ¶ 6 (2002). 
64 Mo supra note 16. 
65 Assessing Investment Policies of Member Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, MENA - OECD 
Investment Programme, at 12, presented on Apr. 5, 2011, 
http://www.oecd.org/mena/competitiveness/Preliminary%20assessment%20GCC%20invt%20policies.pdf. 
66 Trade Policy Review United Arab Emirates Record of the Meeting, WTO Doc WT/TPR/M/262, ¶ 156, (May 
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market has experienced double-digit growth since 2013.67 This growth boosts Chinese 
demand for plastic, a demand that can be largely satisfied by the GCC. These mutual benefits 
present opportunities for proactive market access commitments in relation to manufactured 
products, especially chemicals. Nonetheless, other considerations such as maturity of industry 
would justify the inclusion of short transitional periods for ultimate tariff elimination. 
The GCC has unilaterally stalled negotiations with China, as the GCC wanted China 
to eliminate import tariffs on all its products whereas China insisted on keeping the preset 
protective tariffs of GCC’s petrochemical exports to China.68 Despite detriment to domestic 
producers, it would be WTO-compatible for both sides to agree on partial tariff elimination in 
order to stimulate final agreement. China’s high dependence on the GCC’s oil resources for 
energy security69 would justify the need for China to make a compromise during 
negotiations. Yet, the transitional period for tariffs on petrochemicals to phase out should be 
longer on two grounds. First, the GCC’s strong competitiveness in the area of petrochemical 
products calls for partial competitive pressures on China’s petrochemical industry. The 
second reason concerns the political aspect. As both sides have expressed a willingness to 
establish a strategic partnership and conclude the FTA by the end of 2016,70 this implies that 
the proposed FTA neither serves to achieve domestic policy reform nor achieve development 
goals. Its objective is to deepen the bilateral relationship in various sectors. Therefore, the 
scope and the speed of liberalization is less ambitious.  
Petrochemicals aside, the highly sensitive agricultural sector also calls for a moderate 
elimination model comprising longer transitional period for tariffs to phase out. It would be 
overly ambitious to agree on full liberalization of agricultural exports. This is consistent with 
ChAFTA, where the transitional period for different agricultural products ranges from 7 to 9 
years.  
 
A. Rules of Origin 
 
There are four methods to assess whether a product is substantially transformed to 
confer origin. They are the change in tariff classification rule (“CTCR”), the value-added rule                                                                                                                                                                             
9, 2012) [hereinafter United Arab Emirates Trade Policy Review]. 
67 Tahir Ikram, GPCA’14: GCC Eyes More PE, PP Exports to China on Capacity Growth, ICIS (Nov. 24, 2014), 
http://www.icis.com/resources/news/2014/11/24/9841128/gpca-14-gcc-eyes-more-pe-pp-exports-to-china-on-
capacity-growth/. 
68  Stasa Salacanin, GCC - China Rising Trade Value, BQ MAGAZINE, Mar. 23, 2014, http://www.bq-
magazine.com/economy/2014/03/gcc-china-rising-trade-value. 
69 Mo supra note 16. 
70 Bailey, supra note 36. 
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(“VAR”), hybrid rule and specified process rule (“SPR”).  
Considering China’s past FTAs, ChAFTA applies product specific rules (“PSR”) to 
products produced in China that contains non-originating materials. The PSR adopts three 
main methods to confer origin to non-originating materials such as the CTCR, VAR and SPR. 
The CTCR is also adopted as the main rule in NZCFTA, which was signed in 2008.71 The 
China-Korea FTA (“ChKFTA”) signed in 2004 shares the same approach as ChAFTA with 
some exceptions that permit a VAR of 40%.72  As for the China-Singapore FTA (“CSFTA”) 
signed in 2008, the VAR is also the major means to confer origin and the minimum 
percentage is 40%.73 It seems that the approach in Chinese FTAs is basically straightforward. 
They either rely on the CTCR or VAR to confer origin. However, the recent trend of Chinese 
FTAs seems to favour the CTCR as the main rule with the VAR as a supplement for some 
products. The dominance of the CTCR in Chinese FTAs also shows China’s preference for 
simplicity, as whether the CTCR is satisfied is just determined by a classification code. The 
CTCR has been hailed for its predictability and clarity in application.74  
On the GCC’s side, GSFTA requires at least 35% VAR of the ex-works price to 
qualify for preferential treatment. It also adopts the PSR for 10 products, where the origin is 
assessed by a CTCR. The GCC’s FTA with EFTA is mainly based on the European model but 
with less restrictive rules to chemical products.75 Therefore, it seems that the ROOs of the 
GCC’s past FTAs are more complicated and they vary with the choice of partners to the FTA. 
For instance, both CSFTA and GSFTA adopt VAR as the major criteria. This supports the 
proposition that Singapore prefers VAR as the main criteria to confer origin. Hence, 
Singapore’s preference has a heavy influence on the decision to use VAR as the dominant 
rule in GSFTA.  
In the light of recent FTA trends, the proposed FTA should adopt CTCR as the main 
criterion with the exception of VAR for some products, as the GCC is likely to draw 
reference from its past FTAs and embrace the approach favored by China. Adopting co-equal 
rules where the CTCR and VAR are used together would offer flexibility and reduce costs,                                                         
71 New Zealand–China Free Trade Agreement: Information about Rules of Origin - Import, NEW ZEALAND 
CUSTOMS SERVICE, at 1 (Nov., 2008), 
http://www.customs.govt.nz/news/resources/factsheets/documents/fact%20sheet%2037.pdf. 
72 Jeffrey J. Schott, An Assessment of the Korea-China Free Trade Agreement, PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (2015), (Noting that RVC is analogous to the value-added-rule), 
https://www.piie.com/publications/pb/pb15-24.pdf.  
73 Benefits of FTA between Singapore and China, BRYAN CAVE INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING (2013),  
http://www.iesingapore.gov.sg/~/media/IE%20Singapore/Files/Events/iAdvisory%20Series/China%202013/420
Benefits20of20FTA20between20Singapore20and20ChinaBryan20Cave.pdf. 
74 Erlinda M. & Jenny Balboa, ASEAN Rules of Origin: Lessons and Recommendations for Best Practice, ERIA 
DISCUSSION PAPER, at 6 (2009), https://core.ac.uk/download/files/153/9306182.pdf. 
75 EFTA and GCC, EFTA-GCC Free Trade Agreement, June 22, 2009. 
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thereby boosting liberalization.76  
Furthermore, rules of origin (“ROOs”) may serve as a tool to enhance the foreign 
policy interests of a country.77 Increasing ROOs’ restrictiveness motivates domestic 
producers to adopt factors of production originating in the territories of the FTA partner. The 
international trade literature has recorded many cases of devising ROOs as a means of 
domestic protectionism.78 Besides, ROOs have been recognized as protectionist barriers.79 
Therefore, it would be necessary to pay attention to the sensitive products that are protected 
by the protectionist measures of either party.  
The restrictiveness of ROOs tends to increase disproportionately to prevent trade 
deflection.80 Two types of goods merit specific consideration in the light of their ROOs’ 
restrictiveness because of increased worldwide competition. First, in order to protect Chinese 
agricultural exports against foreign competition, particularly from India,81 more restrictive 
ROOs would be necessary for agricultural products. However, some agricultural products can 
be ingredients for the processed food of the GCC countries. The ROOs for processed food 
from the GCC should not be set too high because processing often requires inputs such as 
capital intensive infrastructures, involving much mechanization. If their ROOs are set very 
high, the GCC exporters would face high compliance cost due to their use of capital intensive 
inputs that cannot be produced competitively in China. As their processed goods usually 
require processing in third countries before they are ready for export, they tend to become 
ineligible for preferential access. Hence, technical content – especially the proportion of 
capital intensive inputs in a good – would be a crucial consideration for the restrictiveness of 
ROOs. It is necessary to obtain information regarding the various production processes in 
order to analyze the technical content of different goods. This would call for a specific 
cooperative framework for consultations and modifications. GSFTA Article 3.15 would serve 
as a good reference for this point.  
Secondly, clothing and textile generally come under protectionism because they can                                                         
76 Erlinda & Balboa, supra note 74. 
77 Moshel Hirsch, The Politics of Rules of Origin, HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM (June 2013), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2275322. 
78 Kerry A. Chasl, Protecting Free Trade – Political Economy of Rules of Origin, 62 INT’L ORG. 507, 507-530 
(2008). 
79Dokki Abdallah El-Kateb St., Free Trade Agreements and Rules of Origin, INTL’S CTR FOR ECON. GROWTH, 2 
(2015), http://www.atdforum.org/IMG/pdf/Policy_Brief_RoO.pdf. 
80 Paul Brenton, Enhancing Trade Preferences for LDCs: Reducing the Restrictiveness of Rules of Origin, THE 
WORLD BANK, at 281 (2005), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/239054-
1126812419270/23.RulesOfOrigin.pdf. 
81 Levin Flake, India’s Agricultural Exports Climb to Record High, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
AGRICULTURE FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE (Aug., 2014), http://www.fas.usda.gov/data/india-s-
agricultural-exports-climb-record-high. 
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be produced with low-skilled labor.82 China is labor rich. Because of low labor cost, Chinese 
garments are major exports to GCC countries.83 However, stringent ROOs might restrain the 
GCC nations from reaping the full benefit of preferential measures, thereby counteracting 
trade liberation. Notably, research shows that applying restrictive ROOs to garments is not an 
effective means to protect domestic industry.84 It should be noted that Chinese producers 
have recently increased their use of imported fabric, especially from Japan and Taiwan.85 
Meanwhile, Korean apparel has become increasingly popular. It would be worthwhile to 
consider the ROOs adopted by ChKFTA for textile and apparel which qualify exporters who 
satisfy either a CTCR or a 40% VAR threshold for preferential treatment. This would be 
preferred to a yarn forward rule where these exports would qualify for preference only if they 
are made of yarn or fabric from either party.  
More importantly, inclusion of cumulation and de minimis rules are indispensable, as 
they help lessen the negative trade effects of restrictive ROOs. Also, as certification 
procedure has a direct implication on compliance cost, 86 it would be worthwhile for the 
Parties to adopt a self-certification process that can reduce administrative costs to exporters 
by passing the burden of proof of origin to importers.  
 
B. Safety Standards 
 
As China and the GCC countries are WTO members, they need to comply with the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”)87 
and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT Agreement”).88 The SPS Agreement 
entails pertinent laws, regulations and requirements for safeguarding health within the 
territory of a WTO member from pre-defined specific risks of health. The TBT Agreement 
requires technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures that protect health to 
avoid discrimination and unnecessary barriers to trade, while adhering to the international                                                         
Gary Banks, Rules of Origin under Australia - New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement, 37, 
AUSTRA. GOV’T PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N RESEARCH REPORT (2004), 
http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/trans-tasman-trade-agreement/report/roo.pdf. 
83 FTA Talks Reach across the Gulf, CHINA DAILY (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.china.org.cn/business/2014-
12/30/content_34440629.htm.  
84 Erlinda & Balboa, supra note 74.  
85 Textile and Apparel Market in China, EU SME CENTRE, 12-13 (2011), 
http://www.ccilc.pt/sites/default/files/eu_sme_centre_report_-
_textile_and_apparel_market_in_china_sep_2011.pdf. 
86 Erlinda & Balboa, supra note 74. 
87 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994 (entered into force Jan 
1, 1995), hereinafter “SPS Agreement”. 
88 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994 (entered into force January 1, 1995), [hereinafter 
TBT Agreement].  
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standards. They can be used to meet broader objectives than the SPS Agreement. Therefore, 
the issues concerning these two agreements would be considered together in turn. It is 
important to balance the need of improved market access by streamlining import control 
procedures and legitimate objectives that justify the restriction of trade.89 
The first priority issue arises from the food crisis in China and the reliance of GCC 
countries on food imports. The Chinese authorities have adopted a food security strategy to 
strive for dominance in the worldwide supply chain for imported food despite its diminished 
exports recently.90 Meanwhile, the GCC countries depend mainly on food imports and at least 
one fifth of the population in the GCC countries are expected to face food insecurity by 
2020.91 Their food producers would experience stronger growth through processed foods 
made by imported ingredients.92 In particular, Saudi Arabia has recently reiterated the vital 
importance of food security as it is a net wheat importer.93 These favour an opportunity of 
mutual trade where China exports grains to the GCC in return for processed food.  
Nonetheless, Chinese recent food safety scandals such as contaminated meat products 
in 2014 and pork from diseased pigs in 201594 would merit specific consideration during 
negotiations of the SPS and TBT chapter. The Parties should strike a balance between the 
importance of market access and food safety.  
Both sides face huge regulatory obstacles concerning the risk assessment and import 
checks for imported food. China has intensified its commitments to boost its existing food 
safety law, notably China’s Food Safety Law, which became effective in October 2015.95 
Besides, the State Food and Drug Administration regularly formulates laws and regulations to 
monitor food safety in general.96 Therefore, processed food imports from the GCC countries                                                         
89 TBT Agreement supra note 88 at art. 2.2. 
90 Fred Gale, China’s Growing Demand for Agricultural Imports, 19 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Feb., 2015), 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/1784488/eib136.pdf. 
91 Houcine Boughanmi, Food and Agricultural Trade in the GCC: An Opportunity for South Asia?, 4, UN 
ESCAP (2014)， 
http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Food%20and%20Agricultural%20Trade%20in%20the%20GCC_Jeev
ika_Sept2014.pdf. 
92 Food International, GCC Food Retail Will be Worth $155 Billion by 2018, GULFOOD (2015),  
http://www.gulfood.com/Content/GCC-food-retail-will-be-worth-155-billion-by-2018. 
93 Trade Policy Review Report by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, WTO Doc WT/TPR/G/333 (adopted Feb. 29, 2016), [hereinafter Saudi Arabia Trade Policy Review]. 
94  Chinese Police Arrest More Than 100 People for Selling Contaminated Pork, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Jan. 
12, 2015), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/01/chinese-police-arrest-over-100-for-selling-contaminated-
pork-products/#.VtO66px96Ul. 
95 Jennifer Clever, Food and Agricultural Import Regulations and Standards – Narrative FAIRS Country Report, 
4, USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (Dec. 30, 2015), 
http://agriexchange.apeda.gov.in/IR_Standards/Import_Regulation/Food%20and%20Agricultural%20Import%2
0Regulations%20and%20Standards%20%20NarrativeBeijingChina%20%20Peoples%20Republic%20of123020
15.pdf  
96 Trade Policy Review Report by the Secretariat China, WTO Doc WT/TPR/S/300 ¶ 3.78 (May 27, 2014). 
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need to satisfy these standards before entry into China. On the other hand, Chinese grain 
exports have to satisfy the food control procedures of the GCC based on GCC Guide for 
Control on Imported Foods (“GCC Guide”)97 and the standards issued by the GCC Standards 
Organization (“GCCSO”).98  
Regarding the SPS chapter, Chinese FTAs are mainly modeled on the SPS 
Agreement. ChAFTA basically restates WTO principles while proposing requirements about 
transparency and the objective of mutual understanding. The only exception seems to be 
NZCFTA, which encompasses aspects regarding the implementation arrangements of SPS 
including risk analysis,99 criteria for determination of equivalence100 and verification101 as 
well as cooperation in respect of technical assistance.102 It also prescribes the obligation of 
timely notification regarding significant health issues and scientific findings of diseases.103 
Likewise, the SPS chapter of the GCC’s past FTAs is based on the SPS Agreement. Notably, 
GSFTA explicitly expresses the objective to ‘facilitate technical consultations’. 104  These 
show that the FTAs of both sides generally affirm the SPS Agreement without extensive 
WTO-plus provisions, except NZCFTA.  
In particular, the SPS and TBT chapters in CETA have widely been recognized as 
extraordinarily extensive, comprising specific WTO-plus provisions.105 They contain WTO-
plus provisions that would serve as good reference for the proposed China-GCC FTA. There 
are two specific concerns for the Parties to consider. First, the GCC members, especially 
Bahrain106 expressly doubt the scientific justification of import checks in China.107 Recent 
food scandals undermine the confidence of GCC members regarding the quality of Chinese 
food exports and, more importantly, the risk assessment and export certification. Thus, the 
Parties should place emphasis on a well-supported verification of control procedures and 
import checks for maintaining the confidence of GCC importers. While the ‘control, 
inspection and approval procedures’ in ChAFTA are mainly based on the SPS Agreement,108                                                         
97 GCC Guide for Control on Imported Foods, THE GCC AGRICULTURE & FISHERIES RESOURCES DIRECTORATE 
(2015), http://sites.gcc-sg.org/DLibrary/index-eng.php?action=ShowOne&BID=696. 
98 Trade Policy Review Report by the Secretariat Bahrain, ¶ 3.61, WTO Doc WT/TPR/S/294 (Mar. 18, 2014).  
99 New Zealand-China Free Trade Agreement, N.Z.-China, art. 79, Oct. 1, 2008 [hereinafter NZCFTA].  
100 Id. at art. 81 
101 Id. at art. 83 
102 Id. at art. 85 
103 Id. at art. 86 
104 GCC-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, GCC-Sing., art. 2.11, Sep. 1, 2013 [hereinafter GSFTA]. 
105 Gonzalo Villalta Puig & Eric D. Dalke, Nature and Enforceability of WTO-plus SPS and TBT Provisions in 
Canada’s PTAs: From NAFTA to CETA, 15 WORLD TRADE REV. 51, 54-57 (2015). 
106 Saudi Arabia Trade Policy Review supra note 93 at ¶ 235. 
107 China Meeting Minutes supra note 23 at ¶ 6.3. 
108 China-Australia Free Trade Agreement, China-Austl., art. 5.8, Dec. 20, 2015 [hereinafter ChAFTA]. 
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the SPS chapter of CETA contains provisions that prescribe a pathway for trade partners to 
agree on principles and guidelines concerning the audit and verification of control 
procedures. 109  It also consists of specific import requirements for priority commodities. 
Therefore, it would be rewarding for the Parties to learn from CETA and negotiate provisions 
for quality guidelines for scientific justification. In particular, both sides should negotiate a 
specific procedure for import requirements of those Chinese foods that have been reported as 
contaminated, treating them as priority commodities. 
Secondly, the GCC members have urged China to improve the transparency and 
predictability of its scientific justification.110 GCC exporters of processed food would hardly 
know the internal operations and scientific basis of risk analysis adopted by Chinese 
authorities. This question draws attention to the transparency of import control mechanisms. 
Meanwhile, China has encouraged Saudi Arabia to enhance transparency by allowing 
interested parties to comment on SPS measures.111 In the Saudi Arabia’s latest WTO trade 
policy review meeting, it specifically called for increased transparency of the approval 
process for Halal certifications.112 It also raised concerns as to how SPS measures are applied 
and developed.113 In view of these, it would be important for the Parties to learn from CETA’s 
promotion of transparency of scientific basis. First, it provides specific transparent provisions 
that would help understand food safety requirements in China.114 It would be effective to 
include a preliminary briefing of SPS measures, especially Halal certifications. Secondly, it 
also includes other transparency requirements regarding changes in the structure of 
authorities and scientific opinions in addition to notification procedures for updates regarding 
significant food safety issues and changes in disease status. Thirdly, in response to the 
Chinese suggestion of a platform for opinions from interested parties, the Parties should 
incorporate the requirement of a comment period from the private sector. Better still, it can 
provide for a framework specifically for stimulating constructive inputs as to mechanisms of 
application of SPS measures. 
To boost predictability, the Parties would need to consider a different approach from 
SPS Agreement Article 5(b). Specifically, instead of publishing any SPS measure or TBT 
regulation ‘at an early stage, when amendments can still be introduced’, they should consider 
a requirement not to implement the concerned SPS or TBT standard at all until it has been                                                         
109 Villalta Puig & Dalke, supra note 105, at 67. 
110 China Meeting Minutes supra note 23 at ¶ 6.3. 
111 Saudi Arabia Trade Policy Review supra note 93 at ¶ 89. 
112 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – Minutes of the Meeting, ¶ 4.67, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/M/333 (May 31, 2016) [hereinafter Saudi Arabia Meeting Minutes]. 
113 Id. ¶ 6.4. 
114 Villalta Puig & Dalke supra note 104.  
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published. This would enable businesses to take precautions to minimize any food risk that 
would restrict mutual trade.  
Considering the Parties’ past FTAs, they generally affirm the TBT Agreement. Also, 
the GCC Guide has taken into account the GCC members’ various international 
commitments, including the WTO’s. Besides, the GCCSO works to harmonize GCC 
standards within the guidelines of the International Organization for Standardization. 
Notably, GCC members have expressed their concern about Chinese divergence from 
international standards.115 Hence, the Parties recognize international standards as a prominent 
consideration for regulatory cooperation.  
Regarding conformity assessment procedures, the past FTAs of both parties generally 
comprise provisions on equivalence and mutual recognition. This would suggest that the 
conformity assessment procedure in the proposed FTA should adhere to the equivalence 
principle and the non-discriminatory principle for consistency. 116  In other words, China 
should allow exported products that fulfil the GCC standards to access the market under 
equally favourable conditions and vice versa. Specifically, China should recognize the 
standards adopted by the GCCSO and the GCC Guide despite distinct technical 
specifications.  
On the other hand, GCC members might face an additional obstacle arising from the 
multiple levels of standards set up by the different regulatory bodies in China.117As Chinese 
food safety laws have often been amended and some standards even conflict with each 
other, 118  the GCC authorities might not know which is the most updated Chinese food 
standard to follow when assessing imports. They might incur additional costs in certifying 
their compliance with technical regulations that are not based upon by the Chinese authorities 
for conformity assessment. Meanwhile, China has expressed its doubt about the notification 
of technical regulations in UAE.119 
Hence, it would be helpful to consider the WTO-plus provisions on equivalence and 
transparency in CETA for reference. Concerning equivalence, the TBT chapter in CETA 
contains more specific provisions regarding recognition of equivalence, 120  for instance, 
information exchange on the development of similar technical regulations. This would give 
GCC members more updated information about technical regulations. A mutual recognition                                                         
115 China Meeting Minutes supra note 23 at ¶ 6.3. 
116 TBT Agreement supra note 88 at art. 5.1 & 5.1.1 
117 CHRISTINE E. BOISROBERT ET AL., ENSURING GLOBAL FOOD SAFETY: EXPLORING GLOBAL HARMONIZATION 60 (Academic Press, 1st ed. 2010). 
118 Id.  
119 United Arab Emirates Trade Policy Review supra note 66 at ¶ 247 
120 Villalta Puig & Dalke, supra note 105. 
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agreement should be considered when multiple tests are applied for the same good. 
Regarding transparency, a provision that entitles a party to request from the other party its 
rationale behind conformity assessment procedures would be worthwhile.121 Better still, the 
Parties should consider a provision that imposes an obligation on the importing party to offer 
reasons immediately to the exporter in case of access denial to the exported good as in 
CETA.122 This would be especially helpful to GCC processed food exporters by reducing 
uncertainties and unnecessary compliance costs. It also caters to small and medium-sized 
enterprises (“SMEs”) that cannot afford expensive mandatory tests.  
The second priority issue concerns the food safety and environmental threats posed by 
nuclear power development. This area has been identified in the Sino-GCC meeting of 
2016.123 China released its first software package for exports of nuclear power in December 
2015.124 Saudi Arabia has signed a nuclear cooperation agreement to buy technology from 
China.125 
Radioactive waste disposal constitutes an important threat to public health.126 Also, 
the improper operation of nuclear reactors can pose nuclear power accidents that generate 
radioactive substances that contaminate food, threatening the health of humans, animals and 
plants.127 The food safety threat arisen from nuclear power merits specific consideration in 
the SPS chapter. Notably, the UAE and Saudi Arabia both have expressly identified their 
need for technical assistance under TBT measures. 128  The proposed FTA would need a 
specific provision regarding technical assistance like the one in ChAFTA.129 Reference can 
be also be made from ChAFTA provisions regarding risk analysis and joint research on 
control strategies as well as other scientific issues.130 As for proper installation of nuclear 
reactors, CETA provisions that deal with the approval of establishments and facilities would 
                                                        
121 ChAFTA, supra note 108 at art. 6.8(4). 
122 Villalta Puig & Dalke, supra note 105. 
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125 Sujata Ashwarya, Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Energy Plans: Problems, Prospects and Politics, GULF RESEARCH MEETING (2016), http://gulfresearchmeeting.net/index.php?pgid=MTg2&pid=MTA3OQ. 
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128 United Arab Emirates Trade Policy Review, supra note 66 at ¶ 39. 
129 ChAFTA, supra note 108 at art. 5.9. 
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be helpful.131 More importantly, emergency measures are vital in case of nuclear accidents. 
The proposed FTA needs enforceable obligations to notify SPS measures in case of an 
emergency within 24 hours. Alternatively, reference can be found in NZCFTA which includes 
an obligation to notify orally ‘with urgency to contact points’ followed by written 
confirmation within 24 hours where cases of serious and immediate health concern occur. 
This requirement would be vital to prevent nuclear accidents from causing harm to public 
health.  
Nuclear power specifically requires the safe design of nuclear reactors to avoid 
environmental threats. Trade in the software of nuclear power technologies should merit 
specific consideration in the TBT chapter. Regarding technical regulations, both the Parties 
are members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”). As nuclear technology 
involves advanced techniques, some hard rules regarding the adoption of conformity 
assessment and safety measures of nuclear power should be specifically provided in the 
proposed FTA. Reference can be taken from CETA’s sector-specific TBT measures such as 
the annex on cooperation concerning motor vehicle regulations. The regulation of nuclear 
reactors might merit coverage in a specific annex in the light of Sino-GCC nuclear 
cooperation agreement. As the GCC countries are generally less developed than China in the 
nuclear power field,132 this would call for strong capacity-building measures to assist GCC 
exporters. It would be wise to incorporate mutual working group arrangements to cope with 
difficulties in cooperative regulations. The Parties can follow ChAFTA to specifically 
establish committees on SPS and TBT measures for the better implementation of the 
chapters.133 
Notably, enforceable FTA dispute settlement provisions specifically for SPS and TBT 
issues are necessary. ChAFTA uses wording ‘shall endeavor to resolve’ in the provisions 
regarding dispute settlement in SPS and TBT chapters. 134 It is also ambiguous as to the 
‘cooperative mechanisms’ referred to in these provisions, thus these provisions are unlikely to 
be enforceable. GSFTA contains parallel provisions regarding specific DSM by consultations 
held ‘within the framework of the Joint Committee in order to find an appropriate 
solution’.135 Such consultations held by the bilateral committee would be helpful to joint 
cooperation of dispute resolution. Besides inclusion of a ‘Joint Committee’, the proposed                                                         
131 Villalta Puig & Dalke, supra note 105. 
132 Mike Orcutt, China Will Soon Leapfrog Traditional Leaders in Nuclear Power, MIT TECH. REV., July 27, 2015,  https://www.technologyreview.com/s/539691/china-will-soon-leapfrog-traditional-leaders-in-nuclear-power. 
133 ChAFTA, supra note 108 at art. 5.11, 6.12. 
134 ChAFTA, supra note 108 at art. 5.10, 6.12. 
135 GSFTA, supra note 104 at art. 2.10(3), 2.11(3). 
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FTA needs to consider enforceable provisions in CETA that allow a party to show how the 
other party fails to comply within a comment period.136 While enforceability is important, the 
political commitment is the most decisive factor to accomplish true regulatory 
convergence.137 This factor is satisfied because the Parties have expressed their readiness to 
cooperate concerning food security in the Sino-GCC strategic dialogue held in 2011.138  
 
Trade in Services 
GATS provides for the MFN obligation, which emphasizes the equal treatment of 
service suppliers worldwide.139 Two other key obligations are national treatment obligation 
and market access obligation.140 There are four modes of supply provided in GATS Article I. 
Notably, the third one offers opportunities for foreign direct investment and the fourth one 
allows foreign individuals to enter other customs territory themselves to provide services.  
The first issue concerns whether the proposed FTA should adopt a positive list or a 
negative list approach to trade in services. A negative list approach presumes the 
liberalization of all sectors except those sensitive sectors that are explicitly excluded by the 
trading partners. In contrast, a positive list approach considers what items to include, one by 
one. A negative list leads to deeper liberalization than the positive list. A negative list 
approach would be preferred in the proposed FTA based on four main considerations.  
First, the Sino-GCC relationship is strategic, implying that mutual trade liberalization 
is unlikely to be politically contentious. The Parties would be comfortable with deep 
integration. Secondly, both sides are open to work together to promote the smooth 
implementation of the OBOR initiative, which encompasses numerous sectors. Thus, even if 
the Parties manage to attain a positive list without missing prominent sectors, the list would 
be very long. Thirdly, it would be challenging to decide what to prioritize because the 
political and economic environment is constantly changing. For example, China’s chemical 
industry has become much more competitive than in 2009 when Sino-GCC negotiations 
stalled.141 As China would consider present opportunities and forecasted trends to decide 
what to prioritize, it might overlook emerging service sectors as diversification becomes 
more intense and the trade profile of the Parties changes. The fourth consideration concerns                                                         
136 Villalta Puig & Dalke, supra note 105. 
137 Id. 
138 The Second China-GCC Strategic Dialogue Held in Abu Dhabi, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, May 5, 2011, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/yangjiechichufang_665758/t819923.shtml. 
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the implicit compromise of the positive approach, where sectors that are not included in the 
list would be subject to the usual trade policy regime.  
Chinese service commitments in ChAFTA have been praised as the best among its 
FTAs, excluding its Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement with Hong Kong (CEPA).142 
The incorporation of a MFN provision for services and investment in favour of Australia was 
hailed as the most prominent innovation in ChAFTA. 143  Meanwhile, Chinese MFN 
commitments are the deepest among its FTAs. 144 Hence, ChAFTA would serve as good 
reference for the proposed FTA. 
The second major issue concerns the area of cooperation in services identified in 
China’s visit to Saudi Arabia this year. 145 Notably, China has viewed the growth in the 
aviation and tourism sector of the UAE as remarkable.146 Also, the OBOR initiative would be 
conducive to such cooperation, as its main objective is to enhance the connectivity of 
infrastructure.147 Apart from these opportunities, four major areas regarding market access 
merit specific consideration. 
First, cooperation in renewable energy is of the highest priority. The GCC has ample 
renewable resources such as abundant sunshine while China has invested in renewable energy 
heavily. China was recognized as the world’s leader in the installation solar plants.148 Hence, 
Chinese technology firms can potentially partner with GCC developers on clean energy 
projects. To ensure renewable energy can be utilized cost-effectively for energy security, the 
Parties should consider provisions that set obligatory targets of energy saving to be achieved 
by the Parties. Meanwhile, they should negotiate a mechanism for support schemes to help 
each other achieve these targets. Reference can be drawn from current EU PTAs that have 
been recognized to achieve higher energy independence.149  
As for market access provisions in the proposed FTA, they can exclusively protect the 
investments of the GCC members in China’s renewable energy technologies and services 
derived from such technologies. Meanwhile, it would be worthwhile to include a provision 
that specifically safeguards the investment of Chinese wholly owned technology firms and                                                         
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regulates risks concerning the construction of renewable energy-related facilities in the GCC. 
In this way, China can gain from the GCC’s rich resources while the GCC can benefit from 
Chinese technology.  
Secondly, China has highlighted the promotion of cross-border electronic 
commerce. 150  Moreover, it views the UAE’s telecommunications market as experiencing 
rapid growth.151 Thus, it is committed to stimulate investment in the telecommunications 
market. 152  Meanwhile, Qatar and Bahrain have liberalized their telecommunications 
market.153 The telecommunications market in Saudi Arabia and Oman have been recognized 
as prosperous. 154  These common preferences favour proactive liberalization in 
telecommunications. Chinese commitments to Australia regarding market access for 
telecommunications under ChAFTA have been recognized as the most extensive to date.155 
Thus, ChAFTA liberalization measures for telecommunications would serve as a good 
reference for the proposed FTA.  
The third area concerns the financial sector, especially banking services. The 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank of China and China Construction Bank have 
established branches in Dubai.156 Besides, the China Development Bank and other banks 
have plans to establish branches in the UAE. These show Chinese support for the facilitation 
of cross-border services to the GCC by establishing a commercial presence. Notably, China 
has expressed two concerns in the restrictions on the number of foreign banks allowed and a 
relaxation of licensing requirements in UAE.157 Addressing Chinese concerns would boost 
competition in the GCC. Yet, keener competition would call for prudential regulation because 
of increased risks. Notably, the survival of Islamic banks have been challenged by the 
expanded product base in the overbanked market of the GCC.158  Hence, the proposed FTA 
should specifically prevent domestic regulations that safeguard the integrity of the GCC’s 
financial system. A similar provision has been adopted in ChAFTA Annex 8-B Article 3.  
The fourth area concerns ChAFTA’s market access commitment in education. Bahrain                                                         
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is committed to pursue broad education reform, 159  while Qatar regards human resource 
development as paramount. 160  Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is committed to improve its 
education system. 161  Importantly, education has been highlighted as a top government 
priority in the UAE’s third WTO Trade Policy Review, thereby calling for considerable 
investment.162 Education is also one of the key sectors that China is focused on.163 As the 
Parties value education services, progressive liberalization measures in education would 
merit comprehensive coverage in the proposed FTA.  
Under ChAFTA, a side letter on education services encompasses joint efforts for 
future work programs to facilitate student and teacher mobility between both countries. 
Likewise, it would be favorable to negotiate a side letter for future joint efforts to ‘strengthen 
cooperation in the field of education services’ as in ChAFTA. Notably, concrete measures like 
exchange programs and the promotion of partner’s educational institutions would enhance 
access to the education market. These can build upon the already deep educational 
partnership between China and the UAE. 164 More importantly, these exchange programs 
would potentially enable GCC nationals to have access to quality education from China. 
They also help the GCC to address the educational mismatch between the qualifications of 
nationals and the needs of the private sector.165  
Nonetheless, unlike Australia, it would be much more challenging for the Parties to 
achieve equivalence on four grounds. First, the poor quality of teachers in the GCC would be 
the main setback for educational equivalence with China. Research has shown that GCC 
countries have mismanaged the number of teachers.166 They are facing a shortage of skilled 
teachers.167 Thus, it would be vital for GCC educational institutions to contract with Chinese 
institutions for joint training programs and performance management systems specifically for 
teachers’ quality. Secondly, it would be difficult to achieve recognition of GCC curriculum 
design for Chinese universities and colleges due to the differences in educational quality. The 
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education system in the Gulf is weak, 168 whereas Chinese higher education has become 
internationalized.169 Thus, the courses offered and the level of certifications granted may not 
be comparable, thus much harmonization work including educational reforms in the GCC 
would be necessary when the Parties organize joint exchange programs. Thirdly, both sides 
have to face different marketing restrictions for attracting students to join these exchange 
programs. While spending on education in the GCC has been low,170 much spending would 
be necessary for marketing and recruitment activities. Fourthly, all harmonization work 
requires a consistently high level of trust and understanding in the quality of professional 
standards and working plans of each other. 
Besides education, mutual recognition of licensing requirements is a common 
challenge for service sectors, as most licensing and qualification requirements are different. It 
would even be more difficult for sectors that have more than one regulatory authority such as 
education and financial services in the GCC. The Parties should negotiate a framework in the 
proposed FTA that establishes a working group specifically for negotiating mutual 
recognition agreements for licensing, monitoring the information exchange of different 
regulatory authorities and assessments of practical implementations so that capacity building 
and harmonization can be achieved simultaneously.  
The movement of service suppliers under GATS concerns cross-border service supply. 
China has a strong capacity of innovation and technology. Improved access of Chinese 
skilled workers can help the GCC countries better manage projects through cooperation. 
Also, China has abundant strong contracting experience, which would provide good support 
to human resources management.  
Nonetheless, there are three challenges faced by the Parties in this aspect. The first 
challenge concerns demographic imbalance. Expatriates account for the dominant proportion 
of the workforce in the GCC’s private sector, leaving many nationals unemployed. 171 
Unskilled workers make up the majority of expatriates while skilled workers remain hard to 
attract and retain.172 GCC countries lack flexible immigration policies to attract them.173 The 
mobility of foreign workers in the GCC is restricted by visa permits and a sponsorship                                                         
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program, which restricts the freedom of migrant domestic workers from returning to their 
home country.174 These concerns are common to all GCC countries, in particular Qatar.175 
And they call for provisions that help to enhance the mobility of Chinese workers especially 
skilled persons. 
Generally, the past FTAs of the Parties contain provisions that offer improved access 
for business visitors, contractual service suppliers and intra-corporate transferees. They 
require expeditious application procedures and transparency provisions. Besides these 
general provisions, the proposed FTA needs to enhance market access for Chinese skilled 
workers as is the case under ChAFTA. Also, an Investigation Facilitation Agreement as in 
ChAFTA should be adopted in the proposed FTA allowing firms that are substantially owned 
by Chinese companies to operate large infrastructure projects in the GCC on three grounds. 
First, it should place no limit on workforce size. Secondly, it should encompass numerous 
sectors, including telecommunications and energy supply. Thirdly, it should lower the 
threshold for expected capital expenditure. Moreover, China could provide the GCC with an 
expatriate labour force to support its growing demand for infrastructure projects especially 
those in the OBOR initiative.  
Yet, the above provisions would not be as significant if other countries also improve 
their immigration laws to attract Chinese workers. Moreover, the GCC countries would face 
an increased need for Chinese technological skills as their economies diversify. Notably, 
Saudi Arabia has at least decided boldly on paper to grant citizenship to 1000 skilled workers 
annually, while other GCC countries have not considered this path at all.176 A possible reason 
why the GCC countries generally do not consider the granting of citizenship may be concerns 
that their culture may be diluted by an increased number of Chinese skilled workers in their 
workplace. Yet, these worries seem to be unnecessary because Chinese culture promotes 
‘when in Rome do as the Romans do’, meaning Chinese workers generally follow the 
traditions of the GCC countries rather than introducing their culture to them. Also, Chinese 
Confucianism promotes harmony. More importantly, it should be noted that the GCC 
countries are geographically far away from China. As Chinese people generally place high 
value on having a permanent home and stable living, granting of citizenship is highly likely 
to be an attractive option for Chinese skilled workers. Thus, the Parties should adopt Saudi                                                         
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Arabia’s bold decision as a pilot program and negotiate an implementation plan to extend this 
program gradually to all GCC countries. It would then be vital to include a framework that 
guides and lay down the pilot program for granting of citizenship.  
Notably, enhancing access of Chinese workers does not mean automatic equivalence 
between qualifications without the need for re-qualification. The second challenge for the 
Parties would be the mutual recognition of professional qualifications. It remains uncertain 
what should be the criteria for assessing equivalence. Also, it would take much time and 
effort for both sides to reach a conclusion on harmonized requirements regarding diverse 
standards and procedures. The past FTAs of the Parties seem not to have an extensive 
framework for mutual recognition. It would be helpful for the Parties to refer to CETA, which 
has been recognized as an ideal platform for labour mobility.177 It contains a specific chapter 
that serves as a guide to the negotiation of agreements on the mutual recognition of 
professional qualifications.178 It should be noted that doctors179 and pilots180 should be given 
higher priority in the proposed FTA. In addition, a Committee on Movement of Natural 
persons as in ChAFTA should be established to smooth the implementation. Professional 
organizations should be required to lead the committee on mutual recognition, as they have 
better knowledge of the concrete criteria for assessments and qualifications. The Parties 
should assign a specific mandate to the committee for devising measures for ongoing 
equivalence as well.   
The third challenge would be the transparency of qualifications. General transparency 
provisions require the prompt publication of materials, mechanisms to respond to enquiries 
and notification of amendment of immigration measures to interested persons. Due to the 
weak administrative capacities of GCC governments, 181 the handling of publications and 
enquiries are inefficient. Hence, exhortative provisions encouraging the Parties to ‘consult 
relevant bodies’ to negotiate ‘mutually acceptable’ criteria for licensing and qualifications 
would be helpful. Model provisions can be found in Annex 1210.5 of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement. 
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Investment 
 
The major investment issue concerns the internationalization of the Renminbi 
(“RMB”). All GCC countries, except Bahrain, are members of Asian Investment 
Infrastructure Bank (AIIB).182 This provides an avenue to Chinese worthy investments. The 
AIIB would promote the internationalization of RMB.183 According to the RMB International 
Report 2015 by Renmin University, RMB internationalization strengthens economic 
integration. Thus, the RMB should be adopted to settle trade.184 The Parties should consider 
adding express provisions to promote cooperation among the central banks and to establish 
RMB exchange arrangements in order to enhance the availability of the RMB and the issuing 
of RMB denominated bonds by GCC investors.  
Besides the redback issue, strong mutual investment interests between the Parties 
present an opportunity for the liberalization of investment flows. Apart from investments in 
infrastructure and engineering projects required by the OBOR initiative, China invests in oil 
exploration and production in the GCC while the GCC countries invest in Chinese oil 
refining and petrochemical sectors.185 On the other hand, most GCC countries have sovereign 
wealth funds. Since the financial crisis, GCC investments have turned from Europe to 
China. 186  Notably, wealthy investors from Saudi Arabia and the UAE are interested in 
investment opportunities in China.187  
First, the Saudization program imposed a huge barrier to foreign investments by 
mandating prior approvals.188 China challenged the mandatory stake of local holding and 
minimum capital requirement in Saudi Arabia.189 Restrictions of foreign ownership in some 
sectors have been reiterated as the main concern at the latest policy review meeting of Saudi 
Arabia.190 Notably, China also criticized the 49% cap of foreign ownership in Qatar and the 
UAE as overly restrictive. 191 On the other hand, the GCC countries complain about the 
tedious procedure of verification and approval for investments in China.192 Hence, the Parties                                                         
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need to impose specific obligations on each other to relax investment restrictions particularly 
those on foreign ownership in some sectors. A model provision can be found in Article 173(b) 
under NZCFTA.   
The second challenge would be the limited investment capacity and market 
intelligence of SMEs. They may not have full access to investment policies. China has made 
commitments to stimulate the growth of SMEs.193 GCC members like Saudi Arabia have 
emphasized the importance of consistency in the implementation of regulations that govern 
the business environment of SMEs. 194 About 90% of all businesses in Saudi Arabia are 
SMEs. 195  They are also important in Bahrain. 196  Meanwhile, the UAE is committed to 
strengthen SMEs through innovative technologies.197 These reveal the mutual interests of the 
Parties to boost SMEs’ capacity and foster a good business environment for their growth. 
Thus, it would be mutually beneficial for the proposed FTA to include a specific article that 
enables cooperation for the promotion of SME investments. A model provision can be found 
in NZCFTA, which specifically promotes a ‘favourable trading environment’ for SMEs.198 
The third challenge arises from the utmost importance of transparency perceived by 
both sides. China has requested Saudi Arabia to offer more transparency in formulating 
investment policies.199 Also, China has called on Bahrain to make investment regulations 
more transparent and predictable. 200 Meanwhile, GCC members have requested China to 
publish measures concerning investment.201 Bahrain has reiterated the importance of private 
sector opinions when devising new regulations on behalf of the GCC.202 Hence, transparency 
provisions requiring the prompt publication of investment measures would be essential. 
Requirements to notify private investors for comments regarding any enactment or 
amendment of regulations should also be included in the proposed FTA in response to 
Bahrain’s view.  
Nonetheless, securing an FTA with provisions protecting Chinese investments may 
prove difficult where trading partners have strong investment interests in China. 203  As                                                         
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numerous resource sectors in the GCC are state-owned, it would be burdensome for China to 
negotiate with the GCC on investment rights because state-owned enterprises in the GCC 
have strong interests especially China’s petrochemical sector. Hence, the proposed FTA 
should include a framework that facilitates cooperation between Chinese state owned 
enterprises with those in the GCC for the better negotiation of investment rights.  
An investor-state dispute settlement mechanism (“ISDSM”) would be vital for the 
proposed FTA because of the expected flow of investments between the Parties. Article 9 of 
ChAFTA provides for ISDSM while GSFTA includes no such protection. The ChAFTA 
ISDSM offers narrow protection to foreign investors. 204 It only enables foreign investors 
from either country to claim compensation for breach of the national treatment obligation by 
the other Party subject to certain restrictions. 205  Notably, it does not contain ‘fair and 
equitable treatment’ provisions. The ISDSM in ChAFTA might not serve as a good reference 
for the proposed FTA.  
The ISDSM in CETA would serve as a model provision, since it has been recognized 
as the most innovative arrangement for the protection of investments.206 Two main aspects 
would be particularly helpful for the proposed FTA. First, CETA’s ISDSM lays out precisely 
the clear standard of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ in Article 9 without room for the discretion 
of arbitrators. It provides higher predictability by laying down the factors that constitute a 
breach of the obligation. Secondly, in anticipation of increasing investment flows between the 
Parties, it would be necessary to incorporate the fast track objection procedure in Articles 20 
and 30 of CETA in order to screen out frivolous claims and prevent abuse. 
      For transparency and predictability purposes, it would be helpful to highlight two CETA 
provisions. First, the proposed FTA should include specific provisions that enable an 
appellate tribunal to review legal or factual errors of arbitral awards in order to enhance 
predictability in the interpretation of investment protection provisions. 207  Also, it should 
allow amicus curiae submissions from interested third parties if they can help determine the 
issues,208 thereby increasing procedural transparency.  
 
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
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Most Dispute Settlement Mechanisms (“DSMs”) in Chinese FTAs, except CEPA, are 
mainly modeled on the WTO DSM.209 ChAFTA and GSFTA are no exception. Modelling 
closely on WTO system would incorporate a comprehensive enforcement mechanism that is 
deemed to be ruled-based and credible.210 
In the WTO DSM, the early stages are based on a diplomatic approach where good 
offices, conciliation or mediation may be ‘requested at any time’ and ‘undertaken voluntarily’ 
if the disputants agree.211 If consultations have not been entered or fail within 60 days, a 
legalistic mechanism is adopted where disputants agree on convening an ad hoc panel. The 
panel will then issue a final report. 
      The first issue in devising a DSM is whether it should be based on a diplomatic or 
legalistic mechanism.212 Diplomatic dispute settlement favours only consultations without 
legal provisions. Disputants may refer disputes to either third-party adjudicators or a political 
body for consultation. A legalistic mechanism refers to ad hoc referral to an arbitral tribunal 
as in the WTO DSM. Both mechanisms have their own merits and drawbacks.   
Legalistic DSM poses two main challenges to the negotiation of the proposed FTA. 
The first challenge stems from political economy constraints. First, academics have asserted 
that a legalistic DSM would undermine the power and political autonomy of national 
governments.213 The Chinese government views law as a means of control and would be 
unlikely to support a legalistic mechanism that promotes rule of law. Meanwhile, the GCC 
governments are monarchies and do not care much for human rights. Indeed, the separation 
of powers is not a practice in the GCC. Secondly, the Chinese government perceives 
litigation with other countries as a setback to diplomatic ties. 214 Litigation seems to run 
counter to China’s ‘going out strategy’, which promotes further economic integration with the 
outside world. Hence, legally binding forms of DSM, including litigation and arbitration, 
seem to be contrary to the political will.  
The second challenge arises from the Chinese Confucianism. China has a long history 
of mediation based partly on Confucianism, which proposes cordiality in commercial and                                                         
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personal deals. Since Confucian ideas have great influence on Chinese policies,215 Chinese 
people generally think that litigation can adversely interfere with social harmony for two 
reasons. First, Chinese people generally believe that litigation is an indication of hostility 
rather than an avenue to resolve disputes. Although the rule of law is supposed to be 
objective, litigation becomes the profession of a desire to win when the respective advocates 
both believe that the law supports their arguments.216 Secondly, a winning party may still be 
condemned even if it wins a case. Most Chinese people believe that litigation would cause 
disputants to ‘lose face’. As Confucianism regards litigation to be a last resort, the 
commencement of legal proceedings would indicate a dispute to be so serious that it cannot 
be settled without incurring legal cost and time. Regardless of the ruling, the relations of the 
disputants would have deteriorated during proceedings.  
On the other hand, litigation provides more predictability and certainty. It enables a 
disputant to gain full discovery of the arguments of the opposite case. Arbitration has been 
hailed as a more workable DSM in China.217 Meanwhile, the GCC countries have the Unified 
Arbitration Law of 2009, recognizing arbitration in the GCC. Arbitration seems to address the 
above Confucian concerns. First, arbitration enables disputants to select an arbitrator by 
agreement and both sides take part in the resolution process. There might be some forms of 
cooperation between the disputants, giving them significant flexibility for parties to tailor 
their DSM according to their needs. Thus, it preserves their relationship under a cooperative 
framework. Second, arbitration is a private process that ensures greater confidentiality than 
litigation. Parties can protect their sensitive information from disclosure to the public. 
Therefore, disputants do not have to worry about losing their reputation.  
Nonetheless, disputes arising from cultural differences may be challenging to resolve 
and may remain unsettled long after arbitration. Worse still, some cultural principles might 
have to be compromised. Arbitrators might even face a dilemma when deciding which value 
should prevail based on a broad notion of justice. Hence, the proposed FTA should 
incorporate a code of conduct for arbitrators, one that upholds their independence and 
impartiality. Yet, the standard adopted by the arbitrator is still subject to perceptions and how 
they weigh in on the arguments. These disadvantages of arbitration might call for a 
mechanism that increases the parties’ involvement in the solution.   
Diplomatic DSM comprises consultations or conciliation, involving an impartial third                                                         
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party who will suggest a settlement for the parties to agree on. It enables the parties to 
negotiate flexible solutions that are more mutually amicable. Thus, parties are more likely to 
voluntarily comply with the obligations arising from the solution. Also, negotiators generally 
perceive alternative dispute resolution to be a rewarding experience as evidenced by its wide 
adoption.218 However, this mechanism does not enable full discovery and access to a formal 
judicial system, thus it may be harder to reach decisions.  
In view of these considerations, the DSM for the proposed FTA should balance the 
importance of formality and the flexibility to cater for pragmatic needs. Thus, the DSM of the 
proposed FTA should be closely modelled on the WTO DSM, which provides for both 
diplomatic and legalistic approaches of dispute settlement in incremental stages.  
It would be helpful to consider the nature of future disputes to tailor the mechanism 
and enhance the resolution of disputes arising from the proposed FTA. The Parties have 
agreed to commit to extensive market access in services trade, an area of potential conflict. 
Moreover, conflicts concerning divergent customs procedures and jurisdictional issues would 
arise from efforts to cooperate on technical standards for OBOR related infrastructure 
projects. In addition, the Parties have signed other FTAs with other countries before this 
proposed FTA. Possibly, jurisdictions may overlap for certain breaches concerning several 
FTAs.  
In view of these potential conflicts, the DSM should also allow for diversity. Diverse 
disputes would call for higher flexibility and expediency in the DSM. First, it would be 
helpful to refer to Article 15.4(2) of ChAFTA for the right to select a suitable forum and 
Article 14.3(2) of CETA for the exception. The ‘choice of forum’ and the right to use the 
chosen forum ‘to the exclusion of others’ provide more flexibility and avoid recurrence of 
disputes due to unresolved jurisdictional issues. For more comprehensiveness, the proposed 
FTA may incorporate the exception in Article 14.3(2) of CETA where the same breach can be 
brought in another forum when the chosen forum fails to make a finding for procedural and 
jurisdictional reasons.  
In response to food safety issues, a specific provision for urgent proceedings 
concerning ‘perishable or seasonable goods’ may be particularly helpful for the proposed 
FTA. To increase legal predictability, it would be necessary to provide a clear definition of 
‘perishable’ or, at the very least, guidance for interpretation. Reference can be drawn from 
Article 29.4(4) of CETA. 
While the proposed FTA would be modelled on the WTO DSM and thus it would                                                         
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contain similar provisions regarding ‘role of experts’,219 predictability and consistency are 
necessary for quality of the panel process. The Parties can consider two WTO-plus provisions 
that have been adopted by China’s FTAs. First, for procedural consistency, the DSM of the 
proposed FTA should prescribe model rules of procedure, such as written submissions and 
hearings for the arbitral tribunal to follow as in ChAFTA.220 Secondly, higher consensual 
elements may be incorporated to boost predictability. The proposed FTA needs a provision, as 
in NZCFTA, which enables the disputants to comment on technical advice and the arbitral 
tribunal to takes their comments into account.221 
Enforceability is essential for an effective DSM. The WTO DSM does not guarantee 
that the defendant will comply with the panel ruling. It only provides final report as to which 
disputant is wrong. 222  The complainant can only self-enforce a ruling by requesting 
negotiations for compensation or authorization from the Dispute Settlement Body to retaliate 
by suspending concessions. The effectiveness of panel rulings in the WTO DSM seem to 
depend on the ability of the disputants to self-enforce.  
While the proposed FTA would be modelled on WTO, it may consider adding three 
main WTO-plus features to the compliance procedure of the arbitration panel’s decision with 
reference to GSFTA. First, it should provide an alternative route for the complaining party to 
enter into negotiation with the party in breach of the agreement to ‘develop mutually 
acceptable compensation’. 223  This favors Chinese Confucianism practices, which prefer 
amicable negotiations before resort is made to the arbitration panel to suspend concessions. 
Secondly, upon the suspension of concessions, the proposed FTA should address possible 
disputes regarding whether the level of suspension is overly excessive by the original arbitral 
panel.224 This provides a more comprehensive enforcement mechanism, which safeguards the 
interests of the defendant if it believes that the level of compliance is too excessive 
notwithstanding its willingness to comply. Thirdly, the proposed FTA should offer certainty 
and predictability by stating that the award of the arbitration panel is ‘final and binding’.225 
Better still, to boost the efficiency of the DSM, a slight variation regarding the 
suspension of concessions contained in CSFTA is noteworthy.226 By adopting such variation, 
the proposed FTA can entitle the arbitral panel to rule on the level of suspension when it                                                         
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conducts a compliance review.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Labor-abundant China and oil-rich GCC countries have been diversifying their energy 
relations beyond oil recently, boosting their growth prospects in manifold sectors. China’s 
OBOR initiative potentially opens up gateways for Sino-GCC relations in numerous sectors. 
Moreover, the GCC countries’ high dependence on expatriates creates opportunities for 
China’s excess industrial capacities. Besides a favorable political economy and strong 
political commitment, the Parties do not have any dispute over human rights, which is the 
main setback to EU-GCC FTA negotiations. Moreover, they have pledged to work together to 
protect their security ties, especially the OBOR lanes and the settlement of the Syria conflict.  
Nonetheless, there are still challenges that the Parties need to overcome, especially 
the attainment of mutual recognition in various service areas because of the low educational 
standards and restrictive immigration policies of the GCC countries. Moreover, the Parties 
emphasize the need for increased transparency in diverse areas, including conformity 
assessment procedures, investment regulations, licensing requirements and China’s scientific 
justifications of SPS measures. The various laws and issues involved in OBOR related 
projects would call for a DSM and an ISDSM that ensure certainty and efficiency.  
While the proposed FTA would be modelled on the WTO framework as in past FTAs, 
it can address its specific challenges with reference to WTO-plus provisions, especially in 
ChAFTA for services trade and GSFTA for DSM. Meanwhile, CETA innovations for Mode 4 
services, investments, ISDSM, SPS and TBT issues would be helpful. The proposed FTA 
should include a framework requiring positive actions to create investment opportunities, a 
platform for inputs from the private sector for increased transparency, a prominent role for 
professional organizations in equivalence, and the granting of citizenship for Chinese skilled 
workers. On the whole, capacity building should be the ongoing key for overcoming the 
challenges and realizing the opportunities of the proposed FTA given the importance of 
technical cooperation in most high priority areas, especially nuclear development, green 
energy, and education. 
